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That globalization causes poverty is a staple of antiglobalization rhetoric.
The Nobel Prize winner Dario Fo compared the impoverishment of glob-
alization to the events of September 11, 2001: “The great speculators wal-
low in an economy that every year kills tens of millions of people with
poverty—so what is 20,000 dead in New York?” (quoted in Levy and Peart
2001). The protesters usually believe globalization is a disaster for the
workers, throwing them into “downward wage spirals in both the North
and the South” (Cavanagh and Mander 2002). Oxfam (2004a) identiﬁes
such innocuous products as Olympic sportswear as forcing laborers into
“working ever-faster for ever-longer periods of time under arduous condi-
tions for poverty-level wages, to produce more goods and more proﬁt.” Ac-
cording to a best-selling book by William Greider (1997),
in the primitive legal climate of poorer nations, industry has found it can
revive the worst forms of nineteenth century exploitation, abuses out-
lawed long ago in the advanced economies, including extreme physical
dangers to workers and the use of children as expendable cheap labor.
(p. 34)
Oxfam complains that corporate greed is “exploiting the circumstances
of vulnerable people,” which it identiﬁes mainly as young women, to set
up proﬁtable “global supply chains” for huge retailers like Wal-Mart. In
China’s fast-growing Guangdong Province, “young women face 150 hours
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work at the Brookings Trade Forum were also helpful.of overtime each month in the garment factories—but 60 per cent have no
written contract and 90 per cent have no access to social insurance.”
Women at the bottom of these global supply chains must work “at high
speed for low wages in unhealthy conditions” (Oxfam 2004b).
Even Western diplomats are scared by the eﬀects of globalization on
poor people: Jean-Paul Fitoussi, advisor to French prime minister Lionel
Jospin, referred to “deregulated global markets” as “Frankenstein,” who
somehow must be brought “under control.” Anthony Giddens, director of
the London School of Economics and advisor to Tony Blair, said there was
a “general realization” that “you cannot leave people unprotected before
the global market” (quoted in Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000). (But
can you leave them unprotected before Group of Seven bureaucrats?)
Economists ﬁnd such rhetoric hard to take, since the neoclassical model
of growth identiﬁes at least three ways in which globalization makes the
poor of the world better oﬀ. Let us deﬁne globalization as the movement
across international borders of goods and factors of production. Let us
adopt the standard assumption of the neoclassical model that poor coun-
tries are poor because of lower capital per worker. Let us identify the
world’s poor as largely belonging to the group of unskilled workers in poor
countries. Then globalization has three beneﬁcial channels for poor work-
ers: (a) it gives them access to inﬂows of capital, which will raise the mar-
ginal product of labor and thus wages (part of which can be taken in the
form of increased health and safety beneﬁts and shorter hours); (b) it gives
them the opportunity to migrate to rich countries, where their wages will
be higher; and (c) it gives them market access for their goods, raising the
wages of unskilled workers in labor-abundant countries according to text-
book trade theory.
Do the poor indeed beneﬁt from globalization through these three chan-
nels? I review how these predictions arise from the neoclassical model’s
predictions when income diﬀerences between rich and poor countries are
explained by factor endowments. If income diﬀerences are instead ex-
plained by productivity diﬀerences, then these simple predictions do not
hold. Hence, it is important to decide to what extent factor endowment
models explain the stylized facts as opposed to productivity models. I ex-
amine the actual behavior of poverty, inequality, and trade, trends in trade
and factor ﬂows, and factor returns to assess whether the factor endow-
ment predictions come true.
I conclude that the clear theoretical channels between globalization and
poverty featured by factor endowment models are not very helpful in un-
derstanding globalization outcomes. Unfortunately, many episodes seem
to require productivity channels to accommodate the facts. Even more un-
fortunately, we know much less about how productivity channels work
than we know about factor endowments.
110 William Easterly3.1 The Channels by Which Globalization 
Aﬀects Poverty in Standard Models
I deﬁne globalization as the free movement of capital, labor, and goods
across national borders. When I discuss eﬀects of globalization, I have in
mind unhindered ﬂows as compared to a situation with restricted ﬂows or,
in the extreme case, no ﬂows at all. I look at these ﬂows from the standpoint
of the neoclassical growth model. Factor endowment models feature equal
productivity levels across nations, while the productivity model is deﬁned
as diﬀering productivity levels. These are polar cases, of course, as there are
intermediate cases of diﬀerences in both factor endowments and produc-
tivity. I use the polar cases for pedagogical clarity.
3.1.1 Factor Movements
In the factor endowment model of neoclassical growth, free movement
of factors tends to reduce poverty gaps between nations. In Factor World,
income diﬀerences between countries are due to diﬀerent capital-labor ra-
tios. Rich nations have more capital per worker than poor nations. Rates
of return to capital will be higher in poor nations than in rich nations, while
wages will be higher in rich nations than poor nations.
The equations are as follows. Let Yi, Ai, Ki, and Li stand for output,
labor-augumenting productivity, capital, and labor in country i (where i
can either be rich, R, or poor, P).
Yi   Ki
 (AiLi)1– 
Let ki   Ki/Li and y   Yi/Li. The rate of return to capital r and wage w in
country i is
ri      ki
 –1Ai
1– ,
wi    (1 –  )ki
 Ai
1– .
I am going to use the wage of unskilled workers in poor countries as the
indicator of poverty to be aﬀected by globalization. I prefer this to the usual
poverty head count numbers, as the latter indicator has a number of unde-
sirable properties: (a) it is very sensitive to the poverty line chosen, and there
is no clear guidance how to choose a poverty line; (b) it has an illogical dis-
continuity at the poverty line, implying a large leap in welfare with an ε
movement across the poverty line, but little eﬀect from even a substantial
movement as long as one stays either below or above the poverty line.
The per capita income measure is potentially subject to the critique that
increases in Gini coeﬃcients could mean that income gains all accrue to





Globalization, Poverty, and All That 111average income growth does (see the recent survey by Besley and Burgess
2003), so I will pay a lot of attention to Ginis. I will show in a moment that
factor endowment models generally predict that globalization will lower
inequality in poor countries, not increase it.
If AR   AP   A, then the per capita income ratio between the two coun-
tries when A is the same is
   
 
.
If there is free mobility of factors, then capital will want to migrate from
rich to poor nations, while workers will want to migrate from poor to rich
nations. This will decrease the capital-labor ratio in rich countries while in-
creasing it in poor countries. These ﬂows will continue until capital-labor
ratios are equal across nations and factor prices are equal, which will
steadily decrease income gaps between nations (reducing poverty in poor
countries). Compared to the no-factor-mobility state, returns to capital
will rise in rich countries and fall in poor countries. With factor mobility,
wages will fall in rich countries and rise in poor countries. Poverty in the
South falls for two reasons: (a) the migration of capital to poor countries
raises wages in poor countries, and (b) the migration of unskilled labor
from poor to rich nations raises the income both of the migrants (who will
gain access to higher capital per worker in the North) and of those work-
ers who remain behind (because capital per worker in the South increases
with the departure of some Southern workers).
If everyone has raw labor but less than 100 percent of the population
owns capital, then the capital rental–wage ratio is positively related to in-
equality. Hence, factor ﬂows (globalization) will reduce inequality in poor
countries and increase it in rich countries.
The predicted capital ﬂows are very large. Denoting ki∗ as the capital-
labor ratio in country i (i   P or R) in the ﬁnal equilibrium, and the un-
starred values of ki and yi as the initial values, we have the following:
  1 –   
1/ 
k∗
P   k∗
R
  1 –   
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112 William EasterlyIn the factor endowment model, even small diﬀerences in initial income
trigger massive factor ﬂows. If we assume a capital share of 1/3, a ratio of
poor- to rich-country income of 0.8, and a marginal product of capital (r∗)
of .15, then the cumulative capital inﬂows into the poor country will be 108
percent of the terminal equilibrium GDP in the poor country!
Suppose instead that income diﬀerences between nations are due to pro-
ductivity diﬀerences rather than diﬀerences in capital per worker. Now
both capital and labor will want to move to the rich country, unlike the op-
posite ﬂows predicted in the factor endowment model. Unlike the latter
case, the ﬁnal outcome in a frictionless world would be a corner solution in
which all capital and labor move to the rich country to take advantage of
the superior productivity. Obviously there have to be some frictions such as
incomplete capital markets, preference for one’s homeland, rich country
immigration barriers, costs of relocating to a new culture, and so on to
avoid this extreme prediction. Pritchett (2004) argues that there may in fact
be countries that could become “ghost countries” if factor mobility was
unimpeded, just like the rural counties currently emptying out on the
Great Plains in the United States.
In the productivity diﬀerences model, equating rates of return to capital
across countries implies that the ratio of kR to kP is the same as the ratio of
AR to AP. This will also be the ratio of relative per capita incomes and the
ratio of relative wages under free capital mobility:
   kR
 –1AR









If income diﬀerences are due to productivity diﬀerences, then opening
up to capital inﬂows will have no eﬀect on unskilled wages in the poor
country. The relative income of the world’s poor will remain unchanged
with this form of globalization (free capital mobility).
Of course, this is a polar case. In the real world, the poor country could
have lower wages and per capita incomes because of both lower productiv-
ity and lower capital-labor ratios. Assessing the degree to which produc-
tivity and factor endowments contribute to poverty is the key to assessing
the predicted impact of capital mobility.
3.1.2 Trade Flows and Inequality
To discuss trade, we need to shift from the one-sector neoclassical
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Globalization, Poverty, and All That 113diﬀer in their capital intensity. In a two-sector model with a neoclassical
production function, goods mobility will have the same eﬀect as factor mo-
bility even if factors cannot move. The capital-abundant rich nation will
export capital-intensive goods, while the labor-abundant poor nation will
export labor-intensive goods. The expansion of demand for labor and fall
in demand for capital in the poor country (compared to autarky) will raise
wages of unskilled labor and lower capital rentals. The reverse will happen
in the rich country. If the equilibrium is for less than complete specializa-
tion, factor prices will move toward equality in the two countries just as in
the factor mobility case. Increased trade will reduce poverty in the South
because of the expansion in demand for labor that comes with the expan-
sion of labor-intensive exports. Again, if the capital rental–wage ratio is
positively related to inequality within the nation, trade will increase in-
equality in the rich country and decrease it in the poor country.
What if the absolute level of labor-augmenting productivity is diﬀerent
between the two countries? With productivity diﬀerences, the factor price
equalization theorem still applies, but it now applies to eﬀective labor
AiLi.The wage per unit of eﬀective labor will be equalized between the two
countries under free trade, as will the rate of return to capital in the two coun-
tries. This means that the wage per unit of physical labor in the two coun-
tries will be diﬀerent. The ratio of the wage per unit of physical labor in the
higher-productivity (rich) country to the lower-productivity (poor) coun-
try will be AR/AP. This will also be the ratio of per capita incomes in the two
countries.
The analysis of which country is more labor abundant will also diﬀer
from the equal-productivity case. If the relative scarcity of labor in the rich
country is suﬃciently oﬀset by higher relative productivity, then the rich
country will be “labor abundant” and will export “labor-intensive” goods.
Compared to autarky, wages will increase in the rich country and decrease
in the poor country. Trade increases poverty in this paradoxical example.
In this case, trade will reduce inequality in the rich country and increase it
in the poor country. Compared to autarky, trade causes divergence of per
capita incomes in this unusual case.
If productivity diﬀerences are not so stark as to oﬀset relative factor
scarcity, the rich country will be capital abundant, and we will go back to
the usual prediction that trade reduces poverty in the South. Trade will still
increase inequality in the rich country and lower it in the poor country.
As noted by many previous authors, interesting interactions between
trade and factor ﬂows arise from the unconventional productivity view of
comparative advantage. Whereas in the factor endowments model, trade
and factor ﬂows do the same things to factor prices and are eﬀectively sub-
stitutes, trade and factor ﬂows can be complements in the productivity
model. For example, if the rich country is perversely labor abundant be-
cause of productivity advantages in the labor-intensive sector, then trade
114 William Easterlywill raise the wage in the rich country (relative to the poor country) and
lead to more labor migration from poor to rich countries. This makes the
rich country even more labor abundant, strengthening its comparative ad-
vantage in labor-intensive products.
Analogously, trade could lead to capital inﬂows into the capital-
abundant poor country, if productivity diﬀerences lie in that direction.
This is the opposite of what happens in the factor endowments model, in
which exports from the poor country of labor-intensive goods lower the
rate of return to capital, eliminating the capital inﬂows that would have
otherwise responded to the high returns to scarce capital.
The bottom line is that the eﬀect of trade on Southern poverty depends
on relative productivity levels as well as factor endowments. Which way the
eﬀect goes is an empirical matter.
3.1.3 Introducing Land as a Third Factor
Of course, there is one factor that does not move—land and natural re-
sources. Even if productivity is higher elsewhere, land prices could adjust
to retain some capital and labor in the home country. This was an impor-
tant factor in the nineteenth century. It seems less so now in today’s ur-
banized world. If land and capital are perfect substitutes, then an economy
could substitute away from land and not drive up the return to the other
factors to make them want to stay. However, there are many countries
where agriculture is important enough that land and natural resource
availability is a potentially relevant sticky factor that prevents ﬂight of all
factors to high-productivity places.
Land acts much like productivity in its eﬀect on the marginal products
of capital and labor. Hence a land-rich place could attract both capital and
labor, just as a high-productivity place does. This was a very important fac-
tor in the nineteenth-century wave of globalization. It still seems relevant
today in that natural resources may attract capital and labor into areas that
otherwise have low productivity.
The relevant equations including land (T) are the following. Let the pro-
duction function including land be
Y i   T i
 K i
 (AiLi)1– – 
Now let capital and labor freely move to equate rates of return to capital
and wages. Let ti   Ti/Li and ki   Ki/Li. The rate of return to capital and
wage will be












Globalization, Poverty, and All That 115Obviously, both capital and labor will be attracted to the land-abundant
places as well as the places with higher productivity. Since both capital and
labor can move, you can show that capital-labor ratios in the two places
will be equated. Labor will move to equate wages, which reﬂect both land
abundance and productivity. If there were no productivity diﬀerences be-
tween places, land-labor ratios would also be equated.
The eﬀect of globalization on poverty with diﬀerent land endowments
now depends on whether the poor nation is land poor or land rich. If the
poor nation is land rich, then the only reason it could be poor under the
factor endowments model is that it lacks capital. Thus, the poor country
attracts capital inﬂows under globalization both because capital is scarce
in the poor country and because land wealth implies a higher marginal
product of capital. This will increase wages and reduce poverty in the
South. This is the relevant case for poor countries with rich commodity
endowments.
If the poor nation is land poor, then we would expect it to lose popula-
tion under globalization until land-labor ratios are equated. There is still a
catching-up eﬀect of Southern to Northern wages. In general, free factor
mobility suggests a catching up of poor to rich nations in either case.
With diﬀerences in productivity, population density will be higher in the
higher-productivity places:
   
(1– – )  
Per capita incomes will move toward equality as well, since labor moves
in response to both relative land abundance and productivity. Hence, there
will be convergence of per capita incomes if both labor and capital can
move freely, in either the factor endowments or productivity models. The
only remaining sign of higher productivity in the rich countries in equilib-
rium is that they will have attracted capital and labor away from the lower-
productivity poor countries. Similarly, the only eﬀect remaining in equilib-
rium of higher land abundance will be that land-abundant countries will
wind up with more labor and capital.
Obviously these are extreme predictions that only apply under complete
factor mobility. We will examine whether these predictions hold with one
natural experiment of full globalization: free factor mobility within the
United States.
3.1.4 Mobile Physical Capital and Immobile Human Capital
So far I have not considered human capital. An interesting case with hu-
man capital is the open economy version of the factor accumulation model












116 William Easterlycapital ﬂows to equalize the rate of return to physical capital across coun-
tries, while human capital is immobile. Immobile human capital explains
the diﬀerence in per-worker income across nations in BMS.
The poor countries’ marginal product of capital is low because of scarce
human capital, which oﬀsets its normal elevation by abundant labor.
Whether scarce human capital outweighs abundant labor is ambiguous for
poor countries. Hence, globalization does not necessarily lead to physical
capital inﬂows for the South, and thus does not necessarily raise wages of
unskilled workers. This could be another reason why globalization does
not always lead to capital ﬂows from rich to poor nations, and thus capital
mobility does not necessarily lower poverty. Here we have the unwelcome
appearance of ambiguity even in the factor endowments model.
However, there are problems with the BMS model in that it explains in-
come diﬀerences solely by human capital, problems so severe as to make it
not really a viable factor endowments model. As pointed out by Romer
(1995), the BMS model implies that both the skilled wage and the skill pre-
mium should be much higher in poor countries than in rich countries. To
illustrate this, we specify a standard production function for country i as




Assuming technology (A) is the same across countries and that rates of re-
turn to physical capital are equated across countries, we can solve for the
ratio of the skilled wage in country i to that in country j, as a function of
their per capita incomes, as follows:
   
–  (1– – )
Using the physical and human capital shares (.3 and .5 respectively) sug-
gested by Mankiw (1995), the model implies that skilled wages should be
ﬁve times greater in India than the United States (to correspond to a four-
teenfold diﬀerence in per capita income). In general, the equation above
shows that skilled wage diﬀerences across countries should be inversely re-
lated to per capita income if human capital abundance explains income
diﬀerences across countries, à la BMS.
The skill premium should be seventy times higher in India than the
United States. If the ratio of skilled to unskilled wage is about 2 in the
United States, then the skilled-unskilled wage ratio in India should be 140.
This would imply a fantastic rate of return to education in India, seventy
times larger than the return to education in the United States.
If we relaxed the restriction of immobility of human capital in this case,



























Globalization, Poverty, and All That 117broaden globalization to include mobility of human capital, this would be
yet another reason why poor countries should catch up to rich ones in the
factor endowments model—because they attract both physical and human
capital. This is obviously counterfactual, as human capital tends to ﬂow to
rich countries.
With productivity diﬀerences, we do not have these extreme predictions.
If the income diﬀerence between the South and the North is explained
largely by productivity, then lower productivity has an oﬀsetting eﬀect to
the scarcity of skills in the South in their eﬀects on the return to skill in the
South. This would cancel the counterfactual prediction of reverse brain
drain. The predicted eﬀect on physical capital inﬂows to the South is am-
biguous as it was before, and hence the eﬀect on Southern poverty. If we al-
low human capital to move with lower productivity in poor countries, there
could be a tendency for both physical and human capital to ﬂee from poor
countries, depressing wages and worsening poverty. If we allow all three
factors—physical and human capital and unskilled labor—to move, we re-
turn to the extreme prediction of poor countries emptying out.
The central message of this section has been that globalization reduces
world poverty if income diﬀerences are due to diﬀerences in factor endow-
ments, while the eﬀects of globalization are null or ambiguous if income
diﬀerences are due to productivity diﬀerences. I summarize the diﬀerent pre-
dictions in table 3.1. Diﬀerent globalization episodes or diﬀerent groups
of countries could fall into either case, or somewhere in between. Hence,
I now turn to the examination of stylized facts on globalization and pov-
erty.
3.2 Empirical Evidence on Globalization and Poverty
In this section, I review the evidence on globalization and poverty. My
method is to look for stylized facts that provide direct or indirect evidence
for whether factor endowment diﬀerences or productivity diﬀerences ex-
plain globalization and poverty outcomes. I look ﬁrst at the overall pat-
terns of trade and factor ﬂows, then at the behavior of relative international
incomes and factor prices, and ﬁnally at the eﬀect of globalization on do-
mestic inequality. I then adduce evidence from factor movements within
countries. The overall pattern tends to support the productivity diﬀerences
view instead of the factor endowments view, with occasional exceptions.
Hence, although there are some globalization episodes that have reduced
poverty, the overall eﬀect of globalization on poverty looks like it falls
short of the expectations of the standard textbook models.
3.2.1 Empirical Evidence on Trade and Factor Flows across Countries
The migration of labor is overwhelmingly directed toward the richest
countries. The three richest countries alone (the United States, Canada,
118 William Easterlyand Switzerland) receive half of the net immigration of all countries re-
porting net immigration. Countries in the richest quintile are all net recip-
ients of migrants. Only eight of the ninety countries in the bottom four-
ﬁfths of the sample are net recipients of migrants (Easterly and Levine
2001).
Embodied in this ﬂow of labor are ﬂows of human capital towards the
rich countries, the famous brain drain. In terms of the simple models
above, human capital movements are governed by the same predictions as
physical capital movements.
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Table 3.1 Predictions of theoretical models of globalization
Income diﬀerences due to  Income diﬀerences due to 
Model factor endowments productivity diﬀerences
Returns to skills determined by
relative productivity levels. High-
productivity rich countries will have
higher returns to skills than low-
productivity poor countries.
Physical capital may not ﬂow to poor
countries if human capital scarcity
more than oﬀsets unskilled labor
abundance; however, model implies
counterfactually high returns to skills
in human capital–scarce poor coun-









Population density higher in high-
productivity places; still have conver-
gence of per capita incomes.
Land-rich place attracts both capital
and labor; in the limit, land-labor ra-
tios are equated across countries; con-






Ratio of wages in rich to poor coun-
tries will be given by the productivity
ratio. Two cases: (1) Rich nation
could export labor-intensive goods if
productivity advantage oﬀsets labor
scarcity; then trade would reduce in-
equality in rich country and decrease
wages in poor country, and trade
would increase Southern poverty.
(2) If productivity advantage not so
extreme, then trade increases inequal-
ity in rich country, increases it in poor
country, reduces poverty in South.
Rich nations export capital-intensive
goods, poor nations will export labor-
intensive goods; factor price equaliza-
tion; higher unskilled wages and re-
duced poverty in the South; trade
increases inequality in rich nation and




Both capital and labor move from
poor to rich countries. Capital-labor
ratio in rich to poor countries is the
same as ratio of relative productivity.
In frictionless world, corner solution
of rich country with all capital and
labor, poor country emptying out
(“ghost countries”)
Capital moves from rich to poor na-
tions; labor moves from poor to rich
nations; equal capital-labor ratios
between rich and poor; factor price
equalization; higher unskilled wages
and reduced poverty in the South; in-
creased inequality in rich countries, re-




tal and laborI used Grubel and Scott’s (1977) data to calculate that in the poorest ﬁfth
of nations, the probability that an educated person will immigrate to the
United States is 3.4 times higher than that for an uneducated person. Since
we know that education and income are strongly and positively correlated,
human capital is ﬂowing to where it is already abundant—the rich countries.
A more recent study by Carrington and Detragiache (1998) found that
those with tertiary education were more likely to migrate to the United
States than those with a secondary education in ﬁfty-one out of the sixty-
one developing countries in their sample. Migration rates for primary or
less educated to the United States were less than migration rates for either
secondary or tertiary in all sixty-one countries. Lower-bound estimates for
the highest rates of migration by those with tertiary education from their
data range as high as 77 percent (Guyana). Other exceptionally high rates
of migration among the tertiary educated are Gambia (59 percent), Ja-
maica (67 percent), and Trinidad and Tobago (57 percent).1 None of the
migration rates for the primary or less educated exceed 2 percent. The dis-
proportionate weight of the skilled population in U.S. immigration may
reﬂect U.S. policy. However, Borjas (1999) notes that U.S. immigration pol-
icy has tended to favor unskilled labor with family connections in the
United States rather than skilled labor. In the richest ﬁfth of nations, more-
over, the probability is roughly the same that educated and uneducated will
emigrate to the United States. Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) also ﬁnd
that the more highly educated are more likely to migrate within the United
States than the less educated.2
Capital also ﬂows mainly to areas that are already rich, as famously
pointed out by Lucas (1990). In 1990, the richest 20 percent of world popu-
lation received 92 percent of portfolio capital gross inﬂows; the poorest 20
percent received 0.1 percent of portfolio capital inﬂows. The richest 20 per-
cent of the world population received 79 percent of foreign direct invest-
ment; the poorest 20 percent received 0.7 percent of foreign direct invest-
ment. Altogether, the richest 20 percent of the world population received
88 percent of private capital gross inﬂows; the poorest 20 percent received
1 percent of private capital gross inﬂows.
The developing countries do receive net inﬂows of private capital, as
shown in ﬁgure 3.1. However, the importance of capital inﬂows rises with
the per capita income of the developing country, counter to the prediction
of factor endowment models.
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1. Note that these are all small countries. Carrington and Detragiache (1998) point out that
U.S. immigration quotas are less binding for small countries, because, with some exceptions,
the legal immigration quota is 20,000 per country regardless of a country’s population size.
2. Casual observation suggests brain drain within countries. The best lawyers and doctors
congregate within a few metropolitan areas like New York, where skilled doctors and lawyers
are abundant, while poorer areas where skilled doctors and lawyers are scarce have diﬃculty
attracting the top-drawer professionals.Capital inﬂows to the poorest countries are primarily made up of foreign
direct investment, as shown in ﬁgure 3.1. Even so, private foreign direct in-
vestment into the poorest region, Africa, is low and is mostly directed to
natural resource exploitation (such as oil, gold, diamonds, copper, cobalt,
manganese, bauxite, chromium, platinum). The correlation coeﬃcient be-
tween foreign direct investment and natural resource endowment across
African countries is .94 (Morriset). This tends to conﬁrm the prediction for
capital ﬂows of the model including land and natural resources.
Moreover, these numbers do not reﬂect the movements of private capi-
tal out of developing countries outside of oﬃcial channels—that is, capi-
tal ﬂight. Fragmentary evidence suggests that capital ﬂight is very impor-
tant for poor regions. Collier, Hoeﬄer, and Patillo (2001) estimate that
capital ﬂight accounts for 39 percent of private wealth in both sub-Saharan
Africa and the Middle East (see table 3.2). It is also important in Latin
America (10 percent of wealth), but less so in South Asia and East Asia.
One measure often used to estimate capital ﬂight is to cumulate the net
errors and omissions data in the balance of payments accounts. There one
ﬁnds evidence of large-scale outmigration of capital in absolute terms in
East Asia, Russia, and Latin America (see table 3.3). As percent of GDP,
the outﬂow of capital is very signiﬁcant in the African countries. This tends
to conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Collier, Hoeﬄer, and Patillo (2001) for Latin
America and Africa. The availability of more recent data since the East
Asian crisis in my ﬁndings suggests that recent capital outﬂows out of East
Asia are more dramatic than what those authors found earlier.
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Fig. 3.1 Private capital ﬂows to developing countries and per capita income,
1990–2001 (moving median of twenty observations)What does this picture of factor ﬂows between rich and poor countries
tell us? Although there are some poor country exceptions that attract cap-
ital inﬂows, in most poor countries all factors of production tend to move
toward the rich countries. This supports the productivity diﬀerences view
of globalization instead of the factor endowments view. The attractive
force of higher productivity in the rich countries overturns the factor en-
dowments predictions of convergence through capital ﬂows and trade.
Hence, we should not look for great things from globalization for reducing
world poverty.
However, the ﬂows of migrants are still relatively small out of the en-
tire poor country population (3 million out of 5 billion), so we should
not jump to the conclusion that the poor countries are just emptying out
or that there is free labor mobility. The ﬂows involved are actually too
small to make much diﬀerence to either rich country or poor country in-
comes, hence the fact we will examine next: the relative stability of the
relative income ratio of poor country to rich country in the era of glob-
alization.
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Table 3.3 Top ten in cumulative negative errors and omissions
Absolute amounts  Sum  % of  Sum 1970–2002/
(US$ billions) 1970–2002 GDP GDP 2002 (%)
China –142 Liberia –129
Russian Federation –68 Mozambique –82
Mexico –27 Guinea-Bissau –66
Venezuela –17 Eritrea –63
South Korea –16 The Gambia –45
The Philippines –16 Ethiopia –41
Argentina –14 Zambia –41
Brazil –11 Bolivia –35
Indonesia –8 Burundi –31
Malaysia –8 Angola –29
Source: World Development Indicators.
Table 3.2 Wealth and capital ﬂight by region
Public capital  Private wealth  Private capital  Capital ﬂight  Capital 
Region per worker per worker per worker per worker ﬂight ratio
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,271 1,752 1,069 683 0.39
Latin America 6,653 19,361 17,424 1,936 0.10
South Asia 2,135 2,500 2,425 75 0.03
East Asia 3,878 10,331 9,711 620 0.06
Middle East 8,693 6,030 3,678 2,352 0.39
Source: Collier, Hoeﬄer, and Patillo (2001).3.2.2 Evidence on Factor Returns within Countries
We have some evidence on the behavior of returns to skill and returns to
physical capital within countries. Ross Levine and I (Easterly and Levine
2001) noted that skilled workers earn less, rather than more, in poor countries.
We saw above that the BMS model of income diﬀerences due to human
capital diﬀerences predicts that returns to skill would be much higher in
poor countries. The facts do not support these predictions: skilled workers
earn more in rich countries. Fragmentary data from wage surveys say that
engineers earn an average of $55,000 in New York compared to $2,300 in
Bombay (Union Bank of Switzerland 1994). Instead of skilled wages being
ﬁve times higher in India than in the United States, skilled wages are 24
times higher in the United States than in India. The presence of higher
wages across all occupational groups is consistent with a higher A in the
United States than in India. The skilled wage (proxied by salaries of engi-
neers, adjusted for purchasing power) is positively associated with per
capita income across countries, as a productivity explanation of income
diﬀerences would imply, and not negatively correlated, as a BMS human
capital explanation of income diﬀerences would imply. The correlation be-
tween skilled wages and per capita income across forty-four countries is .81.
Within India, the wage of engineers is only about three times the wage
ofbuilding laborers. Rates of return to education are also only about twice
as high in poor countries—about 11 percent versus 6 percent from low in-
come to high income (Psacharopolous 1994, p. 1332)—not forty-two times
higher. Consistent with this evidence, we have also seen that the incipient
ﬂow of human capital, despite barriers to immigration, is toward the rich
countries.
Returns to physical capital are much more diﬃcult to observe across
countries. Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack (2003) show some indirect evi-
dence that private investment does not have high returns in Africa. They
ﬁnd that there is no robust correlation within Africa between private in-
vestment rates and per capita GDP growth. There is no correlation be-
tween growth of output per worker and growth of capital per worker. They
also ﬁnd with microevidence for Tanzanian industry that private capital
accumulation did not lead to the predicted growth response (as shown by
strongly negative total factor productivity residuals).
3.2.3 Empirical Evidence on Trade and Domestic Inequality
Does globalization increase inequality within poor countries, oﬀsetting
any positive income eﬀect for the poor (or worsening a zero or negative
income eﬀect)? To test the eﬀects of trade on inequality, I perform some
stylized regressions. I do not attempt a full cross-country explanation of
variations in domestic inequality; I also refrain from trying to establish
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of assessing whether the bivariate associations go in the direction predicted
by factor endowments or productivity diﬀerences. These results should be
seen as additional stylized facts, not deﬁnitive ﬁndings of causal eﬀects ro-
bust to third factors.
In table 3.4 I do ﬁxed eﬀects regressions of Gini coeﬃcients on trade
shares in GDP for a pooled cross-country, cross-time sample of decade
averages for the 1960s, ’70s, ’80s, and ’90s, for all countries (developed and
developing) with available data. The source of my data for inequality is the
Deininger and Squire inequality database, updated with World Develop-
ment Indicator data from the World Bank. The source of the data on trade
shares is the World Development Indicators. Since the theory predicts
diﬀerent signs on the inequality and trade relationship in rich and poor
countries, I put in an interaction term that allows the slope to diﬀer for de-
veloping countries.
The results suggest that trade reduces inequality in rich countries. The
slope dummy on trade for developing countries is highly signiﬁcant and of
the predicted opposite sign. However, the net eﬀect of trade in poor coun-
tries (the sum of the two coeﬃcients) is to leave inequality unchanged. I
checked whether the developing-country eﬀect reﬂected commodity export-
ing, which is often associated with higher inequality, and also reﬂects the
role of “land” in the factor endowments models. However, the developing-
country slope dummy is robust to this control, so the contradiction to the
predictions of factor price equalization holds. I also check robustness
to a time trend for the Gini coeﬃcient; although it is signiﬁcant and nega-
tive, it doesn’t change the results.
The pattern of results for rich countries suggests that some of the pro-
ductivity-driven models of trade may be relevant. If we interpret the falling
inequality as a fall in the capital rental–wage ratio (or as a fall in the skilled-
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Table 3.4 Regression of log Gini coeﬃcient on trade/GDP shares and interaction
terms and time trend (not shown), decade averages, 1960s–1990s
Regression 1 Regression 2
Fixed eﬀects (within) regression Coeﬃcient t-statistic Coeﬃcient t-statistic
Constant 4.103 31.85 4.069 31.42
Log of trade share –0.407 –4.90 –0.407 –4.93
Log of trade share interacted with 
developing-country dummy 0.400 4.47 0.364 3.99
Log of trade share interacted with 
commodity-exporting dummy 0.137 1.82
No. of observations 312 312
No. of groups 112 112
R2 0.2142 0.2509unskilled wage ratio for human capital), then more trade is actually good
for the workers in rich countries. We could have the paradox that labor-
augmenting productivity is so much higher in rich countries than in poor
countries that rich countries are actually (eﬀectively) labor abundant.
Trade then decreases the capital rental–wage ratio. If this is true, then we
might expect trade to increase inequality in the poor countries. Although
there is a signiﬁcant positive shift in the eﬀect of trade on inequality in poor
countries, the net eﬀect turns out to be close to zero. There is a marginally
signiﬁcant slope dummy for commodity-exporting poor countries, in
which more trade does increase inequality. These countries may reﬂect the
eﬀect of earnings from natural resources (what I called land in the models
above), in which a land-abundant country has an increase in the land
rental–wage ratio from opening up to trade. Thus, we could understand the
increase in inequality with trade in commodity exporters, if inequality is
driven by the land rental–wage ratio.
I next do cross-section regressions for the same relationship (see table
3.5). I regress two measures of inequality (the share of the top quintile and
the Gini coeﬃcient, both averaged over 1960–99) on the share of trade in
GDP (tradeGDP, averaged over the same period), and the trade share in-
teracted with the log of per capita income (lgdppc, averaged over the same
period).3 Interacting trade with income allows me to test whether the
inequality-trade relationship changes between rich and poor countries, as
predicted by the theory. I test robustness to including income and income
squared to make sure that the trade-inequality relationship is not just prox-
ying for the well-known cross-section Kuznets curve.
The results in the cross section are even stronger than in the ﬁxed eﬀects
regression. Increased trade is now associated with higher inequality for
poor countries (rather than zero eﬀect as in the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions);
the relationship reverses sign in the middle income range, and there is a
negative relationship between trade and inequality among the rich coun-
tries (the same as in the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions).4 Again, the empirical
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3. The cross-country inequality data have been criticized by Atkinson and Brandolini
(2001) as being inconsistent across countries in methodology and sample universe. The data
set records whether the income distribution statistics refer to earnings, income, or expendi-
ture. For income, they record whether it is gross income or net income. I use these classiﬁca-
tions to adjust measures of inequality with estimated dummy variables for each category of
survey methodology. I then subtract the coeﬃcients on the dummies from the Gini coeﬃcient
or the top quintile share to adjust all statistics to their gross income equivalent. This proce-
dure is far from perfect, as Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) point out, but it makes the best of
a bad data situation. I then average whatever Gini coeﬃcients (or top quintile shares) are
available from 1960 to 2000 (most of them in the last two decades) to get one cross-section ob-
servation per country. The data on per capita income come from Summers and Heston as up-
dated through 2000 by the Global Development Network Growth Database.
4. Entering dummies for primary exporting countries did not ﬁnd any clear results—the
primary export dummy was not signiﬁcant, while the inverted Ucurve in trade share remained
signiﬁcant.evidence is just the opposite of what the factor price equalization story
predicts—greater openness increases inequality in poor countries and de-
creases it in rich countries.
The results are robust to including income and income squared, which
are not separately signiﬁcant. Rather than proxying for the Kuznets curve,
the trade-inequality relationship oﬀers a possible substitute explanation
for the cross-section Kuznets curve (since trade is correlated with income).
Overall, the results indicate that understanding the trade and inequality re-
lationship requires understanding the productivity diﬀerences associated
with trade.
3.2.4 Trade and Growth
What if trade has an eﬀect on productivity growth? The theory here is
not very clear, but some argue that trade carries with it access to technol-
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Table 3.5 Regressions with robust standard errors for inequality and trade
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Coeﬃcient t-statistic Coeﬃcient t-statistic Coeﬃcient t-statistic
A. Dependent variable: Share of top quintile in income averaged over 1960–99
Constant 46.753 30.21 –10.702 –0.24 –1.350 –0.03
tradegdp 0.471 5.72 0.515 2.85
trade∗lgdppc –0.057 –6.26 –0.063 –3.01
lgdppc 18.211 1.62 11.689 1.06
lgdppc2 –1.354 –1.94 –0.697 –0.99
No. of observations 106 106 106
Prob   F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.235 0.164 0.244
Income level at which derivative 
of inequality with regard to 
trade becomes negative 3,665 3,603
B. Dependent variable: Gini coeﬃcient averaged over 1960–99
Constant 39.844 27.8 –7.995 –0.17 6.172 0.14
tradegdp 0.517 5.19 0.400 2.14
trade∗lgdppc –0.059 –5.51 –0.045 –2.19
lgdppc 16.519 1.38 9.745 0.84
lgdppc2 –1.256 –1.70 –0.675 –0.92
No. of observations 107 107 107
Prob   F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.179 0.153 0.1854
Income level at which derivative 
of inequality with regard to 
trade becomes negative 6,805 7,286
Note: Prob > F is the p-value of F-statistics.ogy. In this case, we would expect the poor countries to gain access to the
superior technologies in the rich countries by trading with them, and hence
trade could be a vehicle that reduces international inequality through con-
vergence in productivity levels.
There is a huge empirical literature on trade and growth investigating
this possibility, which has failed to establish a consensus for growth eﬀects
of trade. An old literature covered the correlation between export growth
and GDP growth (Feder 1983; Ram 1985). That literature eventually failed
to make the case for growth eﬀects of trade because of the diﬃculty of es-
tablishing causality from export growth to GDP—after all, both will grow
at the equilibrium productivity growth rate plus population growth in
steady state. If productivity growth diﬀers across countries, for whatever
reason, there will be a spurious cross-section correlation.
The cross-country literature has revived the trade-growth debate with
regressions of per capita growth on trade shares (usually insigniﬁcant)
or some broad measure of trade policy (highly signiﬁcant in Sachs and
Warner 1995). However, the latter has been criticized as a trade argument
for really being a general measure of bad policies and institutions (Ro-
driguez and Rodrik 2001).
Recently Dollar and Kraay (2004) have proposed the testing of a rela-
tionship between per capita growth and the change in the trade share. This
takes us back almost to where we started—they regress GDP growth im-
plicitly on trade growth (the latter interacted with trade share). They take
some steps forward by including ﬁxed eﬀects, but again identiﬁcation is un-
convincing.
Stronger evidence for beneﬁcial eﬀects of trade comes from Frankel and
Romer (1999), who did a regression of levels of per capita income on trade
shares, using geographically determined “natural openness” as an instru-
ment. The level eﬀect could be consistent with a factor endowments view
in which labor-intensive poor countries (who dominate the sample) bene-
ﬁt from higher trade through increased unskilled wages (which are pro-
portional to per capita income, remember). It could also reﬂect a produc-
tivity eﬀect, which would be common to both rich and poor countries.
As with all income-level regressions, the solution to the identiﬁcation
problem is not very convincing. One has to believe that the instrument does
not aﬀect income directly (doesn’t everything aﬀect income?). Also, the bi-
variate regression with income and trade does not consider competing de-
terminants of income, such as institutions or education, which would then
set up an even more complicated identiﬁcation problem. Frankel and
Romer’s result is another useful stylized fact, in the same spirit as the styl-
ized fact regressions presented here. It aﬀects our priors about the beneﬁ-
cial eﬀects of trade on long-run development, but it is not as convincing as
establishing a causal relationship.
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The internal markets of countries are examples of “globalized” areas
where there is free mobility of goods, capital, and labor. They are another
interesting example of what we can expect from complete globalization.
Ross Levine and I (Easterly and Levine 2001) used the database of 3,141
counties in the United States to examine income concentration, popula-
tion density, and migration within the United States. Migration goes from
sparsely populated areas to densely populated areas. We ﬁnd with county
data for the United States that there is a statistically signiﬁcant correlation
of .20 between the in-migration rate of counties from 1980 to 1990 and the
population density in 1980. Hence, labor is ﬂowing to land areas where it
is already abundant. In the model above, this is consistent with the high-
density places being the high-productivity places. It is inconsistent with the
simple factor endowment view in which labor would ﬂow to where the
labor-land ratio is low.
There is a strong correlation between per capita income of U.S. counties
and their population density (correlation coeﬃcient of .48 for the log of
both concepts, with a t-statistic of 30 on the bivariate association).5 This
again is consistent with productivity diﬀerences between areas and incon-
sistent with income diﬀerences across regions being mainly determined by
factor endowments. High-productivity places (which are the same as the
high-income places) attract more labor relative to land. Of course, this in-
come dispersion reﬂects either other factors or the incomplete transition of
the migration process, since the equilibrium with free factor mobility is for
equal regional incomes.
Sorting counties by GDP per square mile, we found a 50-and-2 rule: 50
percent of GDP is produced in counties that account for only 2 percent of
the land, while the least dense counties that account for 50 percent of the
land produce only 2 percent of GDP. Nor is this result just a consequence
of the large unsettled areas of the West and Alaska. If we do the same cal-
culation for land east of the Mississippi, we still have extreme concentra-
tion: 50 percent of GDP is produced on 4 percent of the land. The densest
county is New York, New York, which has a GDP per square mile of $1.5
billion. This is about 55,000 times more than the least dense county east of
the Mississippi ($27 thousand per square mile in Keweenaw, Michigan).
Obviously, another name for these concentrations is “cities.” But even if
we restrict the sample to metropolitan counties we see concentration: 50
percent of metropolitan GDP is produced in counties that account for only
6 percent of metropolitan land area.6There are also regional income diﬀer-
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5. Ciccone and Hall (1996) have a related ﬁnding for U.S. states.
6. Metropolitan counties are those that belong to a primary metropolitan statistical area
(PMSA) or metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in the census classiﬁcation of counties.ences between metropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas in the densely pop-
ulated Boston-to-Washington corridor have a per capita income that is
$5,874 higher on average than other metropolitan areas. This is a huge
diﬀerence: it is equal to 2.4 standard deviations in the metropolitan area
sample. Although there may be diﬀerences in the cost of living, they are un-
likely to be so large as to explain this diﬀerence. (The rent component of
the cost of living may reﬂect either the productivity or the amenity advan-
tages of the area—it seems unlikely that amenities are diﬀerent enough
among areas to explain these diﬀerences.)
This concentration is explained by the fact that most economic activity
takes place in densely populated metropolitan areas. Urban economics is
all about the productivity advantages of cities, which can reap the gains of
economies of scale and externalities between people and businesses.
We also conﬁrm the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) ﬁnding for U.S.
states: income per capita and in-migration are correlated. We do so with
data on U.S. counties. Migration goes from poor counties to rich counties,
with a statistically signiﬁcant correlation of .21 between initial income and
the in-migration rate. This makes sense if income diﬀerences reﬂect pro-
ductivity diﬀerences, but not if they reﬂect diﬀerent factor endowments. A
regression of the in-migration rate for 1980–90 by county on population
density in 1980 and income per capita in 1980 ﬁnds both to be highly sig-
niﬁcant.7
The transitional behavior of migration ﬂows suggests a view that produc-
tivity diﬀerences between U.S. regions are important. However, they fail
to illuminate why regional diﬀerences in income are still large after a long
period of a “globalized” internal economy in the United States. We need
diﬀerent models, such as sorting of individuals and ethnic groups across
regions, externalities within ethnic groups, and other types of poverty
trap models I will not attempt to cover here.
3.2.6 Poor Areas
Not only riches are concentrated; so is poverty. Poverty is regionally con-
centrated in the United States, and these concentrations have an ethnic di-
mension as well. As ﬁgure 3.2shows, there are four ethnic-geographic clus-
ters of counties with poverty rates above 35 percent:
1. Counties in the West that have large proportions ( 35 percent) of
Native Americans
2. Counties along the Mexican border that have large proportions ( 35
percent) of Hispanics
3. Counties adjacent to the lower Mississippi River in Arkansas, Missis-
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7. The t-statistics are 8.2 for the log of population density in 1980 and 8.9 for the log of per
capita income in 1979. The equation has an R-squared of .065 and 3,133 observations. The
county data are from Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999).sippi, and Louisiana and in the “black belt” of Alabama, all of which have
large proportions of African Americans ( 35 percent)
4. Virtually all-white counties in the mountains of eastern Kentucky
The county data did not pick up the well-known inner-city form of
poverty, mainly among blacks, because counties that include inner cities
also include rich suburbs. (An isolated example of an all-black city is East
St. Louis, Illinois, which is 98 percent black and has a poverty rate of 44
percent). Of course, poverty is concentrated in the inner city as well. An in-
ner-city zip code in Washington, D.C., College Heights in Anacostia, has
only one-ﬁfth of the income of a rich zip code (20816) in Bethesda, Mary-
land. This has an ethnic dimension again, since College Heights is 96 per-
cent black and the rich zip code in Bethesda is 96 percent white. In the
Washington metropolitan area as a whole, there is a striking East-West di-
vide between poor and rich zip codes (which again roughly corresponds
to the black-white ethnic divide).8 Borjas (1995, 1999) suggests there are
strong neighborhood and ethnic externalities that may help explain pov-
erty and ethnic clusters within cities. When 1990 census tracts are sorted
by percent of black residents, the census tracts with the highest shares
of blacks account for 50 percent of the black population but contain only
1percent of the white population.9While this segregation by race and class
could simply reﬂect the preferences of rich white people to live next to
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Fig. 3.2 Poverty in the “globalized” internal economy: Counties with a more than
35 percent poverty rate
8. Brookings Institution (1999) notes that this East-West geographic divide of the Wash-
ington, DC, area shows up in many socioeconomic variables like poverty rates, free and
reduced-price school lunches, road spending, and so on.
9. From the Urban Institute’s Underclass Database, which contains data on white, black,
and “other” population numbers for 43,052 census tracts in the United States.eachother, economists usually prefer to oﬀer economic motivations rather
than exogenous preferences as explanations of economic phenomena.
Benabou (1993, 1996) stresses the endogenous sorting between rich and
poor for the rich to take advantage of externalities like locally funded
schools.
Poverty areas exist in many countries: northeast Brazil, southern Italy,
Chiapas in Mexico, Balochistan in Pakistan, and the Atlantic provinces in
Canada. Researchers have found externalities to be part of the explanation
of these poverty clusters. Bouillon, Legovini, and Lustig (1999) ﬁnd that
there is a negative Chiapas eﬀect in Mexican household income data, and
that this eﬀect has gotten worse over time. Households in the poor region
of Tangail/Jamalpur in Bangladesh earned less than identical households
in the better-oﬀ region of Dhaka (Ravallion and Wodon 1999). Jalan and
Ravallion (2002) likewise found that households in poor counties in south-
west China earned less than households with identical human capital and
other characteristics in the rich Guangdong Province. Rauch (1993) like-
wise found with U.S. data that individuals with identical characteristics
earn less in cities with low human capital than in cities with high human
capital. All these examples represent the failure of almost complete glob-
alization within countries to eliminate poverty.
3.3 Conclusions
Factor endowments and productivity diﬀerences are not mutually ex-
clusive, because diﬀerent situations will involve varying mixtures of factor
endowment diﬀerences and productivity diﬀerences. However, productiv-
ity diﬀerences appear to be an important facet of many globalization and
poverty episodes. Productivity diﬀerences are important to capture the
ﬂow of all factors of production toward the rich countries, the low returns
to physical and human capital in many poor countries, and the perverse be-
havior of within-country inequality in reaction to trade ﬂows. Even within
the globalized economy of the United States, productivity diﬀerences seem
necessary to comprehend the pattern of labor migration and persistent
pockets of poverty.
Productivity diﬀerences to explain patterns of globalization and poverty
are a nuisance! The neoclassical model based on factor endowments spec-
iﬁes very clear channels by which globalization would aﬀect poverty (gen-
erally to reduce it). We have no such oﬀ-the-shelf models of productivity
diﬀerences that would allow us to identify the channels by which global-
ization aﬀects poverty. We need new models to understand the productiv-
ity channels that seem to be so important for so many globalization and
poverty outcomes (often disappointing outcomes).
What are the lessons of this paper for whether globalization is something
to be desired or feared? Should trade and ﬁnancial reform promote glob-
Globalization, Poverty, and All That 131alization? Ironically, both the critics and the promoters of globalization
seem to share the same model—the factor endowments model. The critics
fear that globalization will drive down wages and increase inequality in
rich countries, while globalization’s promoters promise that it will raise
wages and decrease poverty and inequality in poor countries. Neither of
these predictions comes true; the outcomes seem to favor instead the
productivity-diﬀerentials model of income diﬀerences between countries.
In the productivity view of the world, neither the worst fears of globaliza-
tion detractors nor the glowing promises of globalization’s advocates seem
justiﬁed. Globalization is less important for the well-being of the poor than
the (unfortunately more mysterious) process of productivity growth.
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Comment Aart Kraay
As usual, Easterly has written a paper full of interesting facts that chal-
lenge us to think diﬀerently, in this case about the links between globaliza-
tion and poverty. Suppose we think of the world’s poor as primarily being
unskilled workers in poor countries. One can then think of three channels
through which globalization, deﬁned as the free movement of goods and
factors across borders, can raise the incomes of the poor: (a) capital ﬂows
from rich to poor countries will raise the marginal product of unskilled
workers in poor countries, (b) out-migration of unskilled workers from
poor to rich countries will have similar eﬀects, and (c) goods trade can act
as a substitute for factor trade and again raise the return to relatively abun-
dant unskilled labor in poor countries.
As always in economics, it is straightforward to write down models in
which these three forces operate, and it is also easy to write down more
complicated models in which the theoretical predictions are less clear-cut.
Easterly nicely cuts through some of these conceptual ambiguities by ob-
serving that cross-country diﬀerences in factor endowments are a key fea-
ture of models in which the links from globalization to poverty reduction
described above are likely to operate. The key empirical question therefore
becomes how important cross-country diﬀerences in factor endowments
are relative to cross-country diﬀerences in technology. Easterly marshalls
an array of interesting stylized facts that, for the most part, points to tech-
nology diﬀerences rather than factor endowment diﬀerences as the main
source of cross-country income diﬀerences. This in turn casts doubt on the
tidy links between globalization and poverty reduction that one would ex-
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Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent.pect if cross-country diﬀerences in factor endowments were important. In
fact, under the strictest productivity view of income diﬀerences, globaliza-
tion will reduce poverty only if it has direct eﬀects on productivity. And on
this count, Easterly concludes that both theory and empirical evidence give
us little guidance.
In my discussion of this paper I would like to do three things. First, I
would qualify somewhat Easterly’s claim that the pattern of international
capital ﬂows is consistent with the existence of large productivity diﬀer-
ences between rich and poor countries. Second, I would like to introduce
an additional stylized fact that I think reinforces Easterly’s case that the
productivity view is empirically relevant. Third, I would like to suggest that
the empirical evidence on the growth eﬀects of one dimension of global-
ization, trade, is not as weak as Easterly suggests, and this provides a more
hopeful conclusion about the links between globalization and poverty re-
duction than the one Easterly presents.
Sovereign Risk and North-South Capital Flows
One of Easterly’s strongest indictments of the factor endowment view is
his empirical observation that we do not see large ﬂows of skilled labor and
capital from rich countries (where they are relatively abundant) to poor
countries (where they are relatively scarce). In the case of migration, the ev-
idence suggests if anything that skilled workers migrate from poor to rich
countries.1 In the case of capital, the argument follows the classic “Lucas
puzzle.” Lucas (1990) observed that the return diﬀerences predicted by the
neoclassical production function with equal technologies across countries
and observed capital-labor ratios in rich and poor countries are implau-
sibly large. It is tempting to conclude from these large return diﬀerences that
North-South capital ﬂows should be large and that the failure to observe
such large ﬂows is a failure of the theory. It is also tempting to conclude that
the right “ﬁx” for the theory is to assume that rich countries have higher
productivity and that this explains the absence of large North-South capi-
tal ﬂows. This is roughly the argument that Easterly uses to build his case
for the productivity view.
But assuming productivity diﬀerences is not the only way to ﬁx the prob-
lem. In a recent paper (Kraay et al. 2004) my coauthors and I quantify the
importance of sovereign risk for international capital ﬂows. One of the
main results of that paper is the ﬁnding that just a little bit of sovereign risk
can go a long way to bringing the theory closer to the data. In the absence
of sovereign risk, both diminishing returns and production risk create in-
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1. Easterly also argues that capital ﬂows from poor to rich countries, based on the obser-
vation that rich countries account for the lion’s share of capital inﬂows. For this issue it seems
more appropriate to look at net than gross capital ﬂows. Here I think the evidence would sup-
port the claim that North-South capital ﬂows are at most small, and this is enough to make
Easterly’s point.centives for capital to be spread across countries. In the absence of a coun-
tervailing force, capital-labor ratios would eventually be equalized across
countries, implying very large international capital movements that we do
not see in the data. We show that with no diﬀerences in technology and no
sovereign risk poor countries should in the aggregate have net foreign as-
set positions equal to –300 percent of their wealth, while in reality the mea-
sured net foreign assets of poor countries are in the vicinity of –10 percent
of their wealth. We next show that reasonable assumptions on the size of
technology diﬀerences between rich and poor countries can narrow the
gap between the theory and the data, but only up to a point. In particular
we ﬁnd that the theory still predicts that the South should have net foreign
assets equal to –150 percent of wealth, or an order of magnitude more than
we see in the data. However, if we also add a modest dose of sovereign
risk—enough to generate the historical pattern of a major debt crisis
roughly every thirty years—we ﬁnd that the foreign assets of the South
drop to only –20 percent of wealth, and this is much closer to what we see
in the data.
In short, my point here is that it is possible to generate quite small North-
South capital ﬂows in simple world equilibrium models in which cross-
country diﬀerences in capital-labor ratios combined with diminishing re-
turns generate substantial return diﬀerences. I do not want to argue based
on this that all is well with the factor endowment view, though. I only want
to point out that simple back-of-the-envelope calculations of expected re-
turn diﬀerences across countries can give an incomplete picture of the in-
centives for international capital ﬂows.
Growth and Poverty Reduction
I next want to introduce a further stylized fact that I think helps to bol-
ster Easterly’s case for the productivity view as opposed to the factor en-
dowment view of the world. An important feature of the factor endowment
view is that it predicts that globalization can have large eﬀects on relative
incomes within poor countries. The classic case is the textbook Stolper-
Samuelson eﬀect: increased trade will raise the relative price of the rela-
tively abundant factor. If the poor are abundant unskilled workers in poor
countries, increased trade will raise their wages and lower the return to the
relatively scarce factors in poor countries. This is not to say that the factor
endowment view implies that only relative incomes will change. For ex-
ample, one can also think of models based on factor endowment diﬀer-
ences where capital ﬂows will also aﬀect income levels. However, I do want
to make the observation that changes in relative incomes are an important
feature of the factor endowment view.
I now want to contrast this observation with the empirical fact that
changes in relative incomes within countries account for only a tiny frac-
tion of the cross-country variation in changes in poverty. This can be seen
136 William Easterlymost vividly in ﬁgure 3C.1, taken from Kraay (2006). On the horizontal
axis I have graphed the average annual percentage change in the head
count measure of poverty for a sample of developing countries. The head
counts are based on a $1-a-day poverty line, the changes are calculated
over the longest possible single period for each country, and the length of
the period varies with data availability for each country but averages about
ten years. On the vertical axis I plot the average annual percent change in
poverty that would hypothetically have occurred had relative incomes
within the country remained unchanged over the period. The striking fea-
ture of this picture is that this hypothetical change in poverty corresponds
very closely to the actual change in poverty. In particular the slope of the
regression line has a variance decomposition interpretation. The slope of
0.97 tells us that 97 percent of the variation of changes in the head count is
attributable to changes in average incomes, and only 3 percent is attribut-
able to changes in relative incomes.
I think that this observation is relevant for the broader discussion of the
links between globalization and poverty in this book, for two reasons.
First, many of the theoretical linkages between trade and poverty empha-
size the contribution of relative income changes to changes in poverty. But
in the data these relative income changes are actually quite small, and on
average they account for very little of the variation in changes in poverty.
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Fig. 3C.1 Growth and poverty reduction
Source: Kraay (2006).This should warn us against placing too much emphasis on theoretical
links between globalization and poverty that emphasize such relative in-
come changes within countries. Second, I think that the observation that
most poverty reduction comes through growth should focus our attention
on the channels through which globalization may aﬀect country growth
rates directly. Here I agree with Easterly that we have relatively less guid-
ance from theory. However, I think that the empirical evidence on the
growth eﬀects of one particular dimension of globalization—greater in-
ternational trade—is stronger than Easterly suggests. I turn to this ﬁnal
point next.
Recent Empirical Evidence on the Growth Eﬀects of Trade
Following the very inﬂuential Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) critique of
the cross-country empirical evidence on trade and growth, it has become
commonplace to hear any observed correlation between trade and growth
dismissed as either (a) a spurious artifact of omitted variable bias or si-
multaneity bias, or (b) irrelevant for policy. I think that such a dismissive
view does not accurately capture the state of the empirical literature on
trade and growth. I cannot attempt a comprehensive review of the evidence
in this discussion. Rather, I would like to focus very selectively on a few re-
cent papers that I think have made progress in addressing the limitations
of the earlier literature and consistently turn up positive links between
trade and growth that are harder to dismiss.
Much of the empirical literature on trade and growth has focused on
partial cross-country correlations between trade and growth. As with all
such cross-country regressions, it is diﬃcult to adequately address con-
cerns with omitted variables and reverse causation that potentially taint
such partial correlations. A natural alternative is to rely on the within-
country variation in trade and growth rates. Four recent papers—Dollar
and Kraay (2002, 2004); Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon (2004); and Wacziarg
and Welch (2003)—all adopt this approach.
The ﬁrst three papers use regression analysis to look at the links between
trade and the within-country variation in decadal or quinquennial growth
rates, but they use very diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies. The Dollar and
Kraay papers use instrumental variables techniques, relying on standard
internal instruments from the dynamic panel literature. In these two papers
the identifying assumption is that shocks to growth in future decades are
uncorrelated with the trade-GDP ratio in the current decade. Note that
this identifying assumption allows for contemporaneous reverse causa-
tion—within a decade, higher growth might lead to higher trade for a va-
riety of reasons. It also allows for contemporaneous omitted variables that
matter for growth and are correlated with trade. Nevertheless, one can
think of examples that undermine even this relatively stringent identifying
assumption (as is so often the case in all empirical work!). An alternative is
138 William Easterlyprovided by the Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon paper, which also allows for this
contemporaneous reverse causation but achieves identiﬁcation through
heteroskedasticity. In particular, their approach relies on being able to ﬁnd
diﬀerent splits of the data where the variance of shocks to growth is diﬀer-
ent, but one can safely assume that the slope coeﬃcients in the regression
are the same across these splits. Despite their use of very diﬀerent identiﬁ-
cation strategies, is it striking that the three papers ﬁnd growth eﬀects of
trade that are signiﬁcant and quite similar in magnitude: a 10 percentage
point increase in the trade-GDP ratio raises growth by somewhere between
0.25 and 0.45 percentage points.
Of course, one can always object that this ﬁnding is irrelevant for policy,
because it links trade volumes and not trade policy to growth outcomes.
The Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon paper also ﬁnds some evidence that a tariﬀin-
dex and a measure of import duties also raise growth, although the eﬀects
are less strongly signiﬁcant. They also ﬁnd quite strong evidence that
the black market premium is strongly linked to growth, although they are
careful not to oversell this result because reductions in the black market
premium reﬂect more than just trade reforms.
More compelling evidence on the growth eﬀects of trade policy reforms
comes from Wacziarg and Welch (2003). These authors build on the earlier
work of Sachs and Warner (1995) to develop a set of dates of trade liberal-
ization. With these dates in hand, they compare average growth before and
after trade liberalization, and they ﬁnd that growth on average increases
by between 0.5 and 1.5 percentage points per year. These are quite large
growth eﬀects, and Wacziarg and Welch are appropriately cautious not to
attribute the entire increase in growth to trade reforms alone. As they
clearly acknowledge, trade reforms are frequently accompanied by other,
nontrade reforms, and isolating the partial eﬀects of both trade and non-
trade reforms is therefore diﬃcult. One way they address this problem is to
look at a smaller set of countries where they can identify a major class of
domestic structural reforms, privatizations. Controlling for these concur-
rent reforms, they continue to ﬁnd that growth increases substantially fol-
lowing liberalization dates.
A diﬀerent strand of the trade and growth literature exploits the cross-
country variation in trade and income levels, interpreting the results as
evidence of very long-run eﬀects. Frankel and Romer (1999) is the best-
known of these papers, and it uncovered a causal long-run eﬀect of trade
on income using geographic remoteness as an instrument for trade. A
drawback of such highly parsimonious regressions of per capita income on
trade is that they ask a lot of the instrument: it has to be uncorrelated with
many other possible determinants of income that are omitted from the re-
gression. Controlling for other factors can therefore make the results more
convincing, and this is exactly what Alcala and Ciccone (2004) do. They
adopt the same levels speciﬁcation as the Frankel and Romer paper, but
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and instrument for it with a variety of variables capturing countries’ colo-
nial past.2 In this augmented speciﬁcation they continue to ﬁnd strong
long-run growth eﬀects of trade.
Another recent paper, Rigobon and Rodrik (2004), seeks more ambi-
tiously to isolate the long-run partial eﬀects of rule of law, democracy, geo-
graphy, and openness on per capita income, again exploiting cross-country
variation in levels of these variables. They use the identiﬁcation-through-
heteroskedasticity approach, and they ﬁnd an interesting mix of results. In
their main speciﬁcation they allow income to be a function of democratic
institutions, rule of law, trade, and several exogenous geographic variables.
In this core speciﬁcation trade has a hard-to-explain negative and signiﬁ-
cant estimated causal impact on per capita income. However, in their ﬁrst
robustness check, they drop democracy from the regression and estimate a
speciﬁcation that is closer to that of Alcala and Ciccone (2004). When they
do so, they now ﬁnd a large positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of trade on per
capita incomes, consistent with the other paper’s ﬁndings.
What do we learn from this? I have tried to argue here that in order to
understand the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of globalization on poverty we need to fo-
cus on the growth eﬀects of globalization. I have also argued that we have
at least some empirical evidence to support the case that one particular di-
mension of globalization, increased international trade, does in fact have
measurable growth beneﬁts. I do not want to argue that the literature has
succeeded in identifying the precise growth eﬀects of narrowly deﬁned
trade policy reforms. The uncomfortable fact is that trade reforms are of-
ten accompanied by other reforms, and so we are unlikely to ever be able to
precisely isolate their partial eﬀects on growth. But the empirical evidence
does suggest that countries that have chosen to participate in the process
of globalization through trade reforms—often accompanied by other do-
mestic reforms—have grown faster.
From the standpoint of poverty reduction, this additional growth is very
welcome. In ﬁgure 3C.2I want to emphasize that even the fairly modest es-
timated growth eﬀects of trade discussed above are nontrivial relative to
the growth rates required to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of
halving poverty between 1990 and 2015. The vertical bars for each country
represent an estimate of the average annual growth rate required to halve
poverty over a twenty-ﬁve-year period, assuming no changes in relative in-
comes. Most of these required growth rates are clustered between 1 and 3
percent per year, and vary with the initial location and shape of the distri-
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2. The paper contains two other important methodological innovations. The authors re-
calculate the original Frankel-Romer instrument based on more, and more recent, data, and
they also measure trade as a fraction of purchasing power parity–adjusted GDP in order to
have a cleaner measure of cross-country diﬀerences in real trade volumes relative to produc-
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Fig. 3C.2 Growth required to halve poverty over twenty-ﬁve years
bution of income in the country. The horizontal line at 0.5 percent shows
the estimated growth eﬀect of trade (with all the caveats noted above) of a
20 percentage point increase in the trade-GDP ratio. Of course, one can-
not conclude from this graph that narrow trade reforms in isolation will re-
duce poverty at the rate envisioned in the Millennium Development Goals.
But we can say that the growth beneﬁts of globalization have a nontrivial
role in economic development and poverty reduction.
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